Are Our Behavioural Dispositions Evidence of Mental States, or Are They Mental States?

'Our behavioural dispositions are not merely evidence of the existence of our mental states, they constitute our mental states'.

An answer sufficient to appease;  upon first impression of such a contention, would have to be one of compromise. Common-sense tells us that a person's behaviour is a reliable means of understanding their present inward state. To conclude that nothing occurs in the mind except what is observed in its external manifestation, or that behavioural dispositions constitute our mental states (exempting a respective mental cognitive process), as is advocated by many materialist philosophers, is a tougher pill to swallow. 

Outward expressions like speech, body language or facial expressions, are essential to every day inter-subjective communication, and one may presume that they are the most prominent means of sharing concepts, and understanding one another's complex inner beliefs and sensations. The issue under dispute is precisely that complexity of the human consciouss, to develop into an advanced species, the wealth of knowledge, culture, and recorded literature amassed in society, widely assumed to raise us above our fellow non-humans. As literature and art has progressed, the greatest minds, painters and authors alike, have continuosly outdone their predecessors in  capturing the nuances of varying indivudals, peoples, and cultures. As a result, the notion of reducing man's thought into simple, calculable and finite dispositions, leaves much to be desired, in particular due to the dire ethical consequences which it seemingly entails. Amongst the questions which arise are those of the belief in free-will, autonomy, and responsibility. Of course, the impacts on religion are even more disastrous; the materialist would be glad to exitinguish the human soul, its immortality and reincarnation, the idea of a higher reality, or possibly even the platonic forms. In an age where psychology and science rule the stage, it only takes a few additional steps until, a human being may lose his individuality. How, for example, could one consider a murderer to have any moral responsibility if his act was merely a set of dispositions, interprable by means-ends reasoning, his behaviour not irrational, but  simply due to his unawareness of certain choices which were in his interest to take?

Unfortunately, just because it is not pleasant, doesnt mean it is not true. There are several approaches which an opponent of such views may use. The most obvious is that there appears no way to limit the dispositions which an indivudal may have when showing signs of behaviour. Amongst the types of outward behaviour which can be analysed, bodily expression and non-verbal expression are the most reliable and often considered the only 'verifiable' manifestations of an inner state. The problem with the theory is that in order for a mental state to be accounted for, it must have dispositions which will always be true of his state, thus, when a dodgy person is walking erratically, and raising his voice at a counter in a bank, one could attribute this behaviour to a disposition to rob the bank, play a prank, or take revenge on his brother for having a better job, amongst which all are (farily) reasonable. The placid staff may then decide to press the red button without hesitation, however the possibility remains that the criminal may be deceived into thinking it was an actors studio, he may be chasing after his dog, or may be disapproving of the architecture. In the first example, the man has a false belief about his location, in the others he knows but has no intention of robbing the bank. The list of possible dispositions is easily exhausted by other possibilities, and the most obvious disposition is merely contigently and not necessarliy true of all mental states or, contexts. 

In addition to this is there are entire environmental and emotional phenomena which may have a causal chain leading back indefinately. The vagabond could have contemplated robbing the bank many times upon passing the street, yet on this occasion it chanced that the sun was at a particular position in the sky and causing the light to blind him inadvertently, and maybe, subconscioussly, caused such irritation, whereupon his nerves finally broke and he had to run in and carry out his plan. One cannot therefore assume that evertime that same man, or any other man  for that matter, is met with parting clouds, he too, will part with his sanity and empty out into the nearest shop. For this to apply would require spacio-temporal unity. The materialist may reproach these as contrived examples, but just because it is not pleasant, doesnt mean it is not true.

There is therefore a discrepancy between intension and perceived intention. If the criminal is not, himself, aware as to the precise cause of his actions, and is merely driven by a set of internal emotions or a subconsciouss drive, how can an observer correlate his interpretation with any subjective conviction. Ultimately this would require knoweldge of his entire being, and each causal influence upon his action. If one asks the criminal why of all times he considered his actions, it was then, it would be near impossible to provide an answer. The only solution would be to, take a snapshot of his brain at the precise moment and even then, something like a sudden 'flow of blood' in a certain part of the brain may be due to another causal force, however an analyis of this sort merely leads into a vicious circle, new questions would arise such as 'what types of thought would the brain produce if rmeoved from all sensory devices'. This lies beyond the scope of this essay to discuss. The problem is compounded further in the light of the 'Beetle in the box' argument, by Wittgenstein. Essentially the beetle in the box argument, reveals the serious concerns of 'private' and 'public' language. The term beetle is subjective, 'private' language and may only refer to that individuals concept of a beetle and no one other's. Crucially, the term beetle, if not invented by the individual himself, takes its validity for naming the object from the assumption in the realm of 'public' language.What essentially gaurnatees an inter-subjective agreement is, the categorisation of properties, which in turn holds its roots in logcic ie. A spider has 8 legs, a beetle has 6, that object 3 so it is neither. Supposedly, the naming of species falls under its own errors and scrutiny, even then, the real poblem arises when converting inner states into logical language statements. Two cultures may interpret 'depression' very differently, and any two people for that matter. Even if the criminal was aware of his inner state at the moment of robber he couldnt even explain it.

We have thus established that non-verbal and verbal, behaviour are unreliable due to epistemic asymmetry. False beliefs, a subconsciouss drive, subjectivism, all ruin any possiblilty of non-empirical, objective, facts. Simple inductive observations, such as the stimuli-response, and conditioning test employed in methodological philosophy and psychology  might provide the most solid, if empirical, basis for judgement. Physiogonomy, body language, and reaction times, have been enlightening sources of understanding in the realm of psychology, catered for by Pavlov and Skinner througout the 20th century. However, the super-stoic and hyperchondriac remain obstacles in such an inductive approach. If we didnt have language, would our thought processes be as complex?; does knowledge or language create new inner states ie. having affected our natural/physiological  development?; do we need to develop a new language to capture our inner thoughts (is that not what literature is about) would it be merely more misinterpretation? -

Roger Scruton, Modern Philosophy, Mandarin 1991

J. Kim, Philosophy of mind, Oxford, Westview, 1996