Russell's Theory in 'On Denoting'

 Does Russell's Theory in 'On Denoting' provide' provide a satisfactory answer to the problems posed by empty names?

One problem of empty names is that they denote an event, person, or object which can fail to exist. Reference to non-existent persons such as the 'the present Tsar of Russia' or 'the present King of France' or the 'present Prime Minister of the United States'. Each of these examples refer to titles which have existed but at the time of their utterance , do not exist. The clearest example is the statement: 'The present king of France is bald' , which is referring to an non-existent entitiy 'The King of France'. Another example of an empty name is one which shares two identities, such as that Superman = Clark Kent, Mark Twain = Samuel Clemens, The present Queen of England = Elizabeth Windsor. WHen referring to one of these cases however it ought to be that, due to them being one and the same, a listenter ought to understand the same when hearing both, however in that case all of the statements would be analytic and tirivial and read as Smauel Clemens = Samuel CLemens, Superman = Superman, The present Queen of England = The present Queen of England. It is clear that this is not the case however, since the difnitions are contingently true in some cases, since ti could have been possible that the Queen of England was someone else. The main type of problem raised in this essay will however be that dealing with non-existent referentials in linguistic use.

Russell attemptedt o solve the problem of empty names in a different sense than treat the use of non-existents as gratuitious, which is what other theorists such as MEinong considered the best solution. He also thought that it was wrong to differentiate between the sense of a word 'Sinn' and the denoting of  it 'Bedeutung', which Frege held would account for empty names. The aim of this paper is to show that, despite overcoming problems of contradiction, Russell'stheory places the truth value of propositions on whether the referent is existent or not, and that this is not where meaning originates.

Russell's answer to the problem of non-existents is by reduign the denotative term 'the' to several logical statements:

1) There is at least on person who is the present King of France (x)

2) There is at most one person who is the present King of France (x)

3) That King (x) is bald 

 

What the denotative term becomes is a container from which the trith of the proposotion which is contaoined within it is confirmed. It is therefore the case that under all phrases that occur with the term 'the (x)' will include these logicla definitions, and read 'there is at least and at most one person who is at present the King of France, and that King is bald.' Any statement in which the name is referred to is therefore immediately false. To predicate something of a non-existent would be a contradiction because it is assumed that the subject of the statement ie. the referent, is the cause for ascribing the property to it and would have at least confirmed or assumed the existence of the King prior to making the assertion. It would be assumed that the statement is about ones knowledge, which implies having the occasion to witness for oneself the King of France and thus ascribe to him the property of baldness.  The explication of the denotative term 'The' helps overcome the immediate problem of existence

Having given the denotative word 'the' fixed class limits of 'there is one and only one' one is making clear certain assumptions made of the subject. The sentence fails immediately once one acknowledges that the King of Fance does not exist, and it follows that there cannot be a present King of France, and therefore the property of baldness applies to non-existent much in the same way that the term 'present' applies to a non-existent being. To state the term 'present' is nothing other than to state 'the existing'. 'A King of France exists, only one King of France exists, and that King of France has the property of baldness.' This eliminates the statements such as 'the King is not bald but exists', 'the King was not bald during his existence; however if that King never existed than he can never have been bald, and since he did not, that statement is immediately false. 

The word 'present' has no other meaning than 'there exists'. Russell argues against the Sinn and beduetung distinction as a means of seperating the truth-values of propositions. The statement 'The present King of England' is no different in form from the statement 'The present king of France'. But, replacing 'present' with 'there exists' leaves the fomer open to scrutiny. In such a case it is clear that the term present does have a meaning other than the statement 'there exists' which lies in the utterer's intention.

In another problem, the problem of identitiy, Russell's theory of definite descriptions proves that two distinct names of one identity can have meaning. In a statement 'The present Queen of England is Elisabeth Windsor, one is not tring to predicate a fact about either side of the equivalence. However it highlights a concern which is that names can also have truth values. The sentence 'there is at least one, and only one Queen of England and she is Elisabeth Windsor' is not that same as saying There is at least one, and only one Elisabeth Windsor - it is clear that Russells' theory overcomes the problems by restraining the subject to an objectively true name and one contingently true name. It solves further metaphorical problems as well. Michael Jackson has often been dubbed 'the king of pop and rock', this statement  might be true in a metaphorical sense, but since there existing no such thing as King of a music genre it is clear that Michael Jackson isn't really a King at all.

In one sense this is no different than saying 'the existing king of France does not exist' because the term 'present' is tanatmount to saying 'there exists', the semantic difference only suggests an assumption in the former while the latter makes it explicit. According to Russell's distinction therefore, this statement woul be false, since it would be nothing other than stating 'It is true that the King of France both exists and does not exist'. In context however, both of these sentences can have truth values independently of the the truth value of existence, since it is easily possible to think up a conversation or context in which the statement would be made non-trivial in its utterance. If, in a newspaper article we read 'The recent cadidate for MP in Gloucester failed to pay his taxes' but one knew that that candidate has passed away only a few days before local elections having read this in another newspaper, and for the sake of the argument, one were to have attended the funeral of this MP, it is clear that the proposition is a mistake and not an attempt at deceiving the population. If the statement about a King of France were the headlines during the French Revolution one would ascribe to it any number of meanings related with existence, it might be metaphorical prior to the revolution, in the same way a gangster in a movie might state 'you're a dead man'. It could be a statement of fact after the revolution. In a sense one can state that there is a certain connetion between 'present' and 'existent' although not synonymous, still meaning the same thing, such as in comparison with the sentence 'I bought my second pint with no money' which is problematic since buying implies 'paying money' in the same way that being 'present' implies being 'existent'. In both cases one could think of a context in which their referent may, metaphorically speaking,be  true, but the utterance itself is contradictory if the grounds of their expression is existence or non-existence of the object.

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The referantial theory, as regards names of objects also has its own difficulties. Different names of objects can lead to contradictions in their reference, such as the 'stonehenge'. If one imagines the stonehenge in the nineteenth century, it is plausible that there may have been individuals who, despite of being amazed by its grandeur would have expected a couple of similar things to lie strewn throughout the area. During research work amongst another group of people however it might have been established through reading of archaeological texts that it was referred to as 'stonehenge' by the ancients and that it was a unique. Some other people might have attached a certain enigmatic mystery to it and worshipped it as the 'circular ruins made for some deity' . Therefore, the question arises, at one point can one call a name a true description, or at least a finite property? To say that a name is independent of meaning, whether of an objetcively real turht or contextual truth, At one point is one ascribing a name or a description, are they interchangeable to some degree?

'There is at least one circular ruin of rocks, and only one circualr ruin of rocks, and that is stonehenge.'

'There is at least one stonehenge, and only one stonehenge, and that is a circular ruin of rocks.'

The chief objection to Russell's theory of definite descriptions is that of Strawson which holds that the truth of a sentence does not depend on making a statement of an existing or non-existing thing. Empty names are names which refer to non-existent things. Such as the fictional character 'Hamlet', the ghost of my aunt 'Sally', 'Pegasus', 'Mortimer', 'Roger Rabbit'. Accustomising oneself to language, and verbal communication, is the same as learning to walk. Just as one doesn't consider the effects of gravity prior to the next step one is taking, the non-existence or existence of a character in a novel, movie,of an idea, or interpretation of a painting, does not prevent a description of them having meaning, and even a contingent truth value. With regard to descriptions of names, one can distinguish meaning from truth on the grounds of context. One might argue whether truth-seeking is the primary aim of all communication, as it is a means to accomplishing something, or providing secure knowledge of something without which life might be problematic - the bus schedule, a weather report, even the sincerity of a compliment. Questions such as these can range from the cessation of construction on the highway, to the existence of God: some unprovable, others provable (at least empirically). Merely talking about God does not require that God exists. This raisies other problems concerning the dgree of truth which can be attained by language. 

Neverthelss, within a given context, a sentence can have a contingent truth value and not an absolute one. The statement 'Hamlet was the Prince of Denmark' may be referring to a non-existent entitiy, but as a response to the question 'What was the title of Hamlet in the play Hamlet?' It is clear that there is a truth value to the statement. As a response to a question posed, the non-existence of Hamlet plays no role, in particular since both parties have already assumed that such is the case, and since general conversation does not require having to raise the question of existence. A situation might arise in which an individual unaquainted with Shakespeare might assume that the reference is to an existing person, and might think that the current Prince of Denmark has called himself Hamlet in overhearing the conversation, however this has no relevance to the the truth of the answer in response to the question, since it was intended as an explication to the person who gave the question not as a statement which is true under all circumstances. In general conversation this applies too, since it is often the case if we hear someone mentioning a name very familiar which is unique in ones collection of friends' names one might consider that person being the same.

Russell argues against the distinction between sense and denotation in accordance with the fact that tow sentences with identical form can refer to existent of non-existent referetns. That the present King if France sounds like the present King of England indicates that the speakers intentions could have been identical yet the latter is false because it referent is not somehtin gthat exists. But this comparison soon falls apart when one compares any other linguistic equal such as the 'The present Tsar of Russia' sounds like 'The present King of France' but the semantic gap, between both these statements and their true equivalent 'The present King of England' is much greater.   Moreover, it seems that in everyday discussion the truth of a desciption of person is treated as gratuitous in the sense that one assumes that certain statements account for the existence of a person, the eixstence of an object, the 'real' and not metaphoric description of an object ('the rose', and not love). Misinterpretations, such as those which might arise out of a particular form of expression have there root not in the fact that they do not account for the eixstence or non-existence of objects, or do not include in their pronouncement the explication of the existence of their referent, but merely in the speaker intention or failure to pronounce their intentions in such away as to make clear what their intention was. The present king of France is bald (The Philosophy of Language, William G Lycan) is a sentence which if one were to grant the speak intentionality, would not be something they would utter, since it would not stem from a logical thought process, it would have to be wrong before it was stated. It would make more sense to say that 'the King of France is bald', rather than say that 'the present King of France' is bald, it almost appears as if the utterance is being forced to produce an absurduty. Although it is undeniable that a paradox is produced out of the sentence due to non-existent, it cannot be something which would be used as speech intention, because it would imply that the utterance would be worng before it was stated. If one distinguishes between the intentions of a speaker and failed intentions it becomes clear that no object referred to can be completely empty since discussion about 'Pegasus' are assumed to be about a non-existent thing. In the same way that word are taugh to infants they are merely referred to and the infant accustomises itself to the object and eventuall learns to adopt 'dog' as the In the former one might grant igonorance in the latter it seems that one merely trying to confuse someone. If it were in the context such as watching the television 'I thought that this character always plays the role of the king of Spain' which might be followed by  'well, the present King of France is bald, so it must be that actor because he is bald too.' Therefore a statement such as 'Albert Einstein stood here' one would assume immediately that Albert Einstein, being dead must have stood there before his death, and as long as that period of time is not before the period in which it was stated, the proposition is true in reality. What appears to be an analytic statement about non-existent objects, and a clear truth is  'All unicorns have one horn'. The predicate is contained within the concept of the subjetc much in the same way a 'tripod has three legs', and 'a square has four sides' or 'all matter is extended', 'every effect has a cause'. However, unlike these objects which we know to exist having been the cause of their existence in language- the example of the unicorn is something which is known not to exist.