Nietzsche and Pity
"But, in fact, they are one and all united
in thorough and instinctive hostility towards all forms of society besides
that of the autonomous herd (even to the point of rejecting the concepts of
“master” and “slave” – ni dieu ni maˆıtre reads a socialist formula –); they
are united in their dogged opposition to any special claims, special rights,
or privileges (which means, in the last analysis, that they are opposed
to any rights: since when everyone is equal, no one will need “rights”
anymore –); they are united in their mistrust of punitive justice (as if it
were a violation of those who are weaker, a wrong against the necessary Neither God nor master. On the natural history of morals
result of all earlier societies –); but they are likewise united in the religion
of pity, in sympathy for whatever feels, lives, suffers (down to the animal
and up to “God”: – the excessive notion of “pity for God” belongs in a
democratic age –); they are all united in the cries and the impatience of
pity, in deadly hatred against suffering in general, in the almost feminine
inability to sit watching, to let suffering happen; they are united in the
way they involuntarily raise the general level of sensitivity and gloom under whose spell Europe seems threatened with a new Buddhism; they are
united in their faith in the morality of communal pity, as if it were morality
in itself, the height, the achieved height of humanity, the sole hope for the
future, the solace of the present, the great redemption of all guilt from
the past: – they are all united in their faith in the community as Redeemer,
which is to say: in the herd, in “themselves”..." (F. Nietzsche, BGE, 202)
nietzsche's views on pity are clear. he believes it saps the individual of vitality, and multiplies the amount of suffering in the world. throughout his writing, he consistently argues that pity for others is never motivated by selfless reasons, regardless of how much we believe they are. when we perform a supposed selfless act -he claims - we are in fact unconsciously driven by many selfish motives, whether it means to secretly assert our power, relieve ourselves of the sight of others' sufferings, or to improve our reputation in the eyes of others. for the proud warrior, pity is contemptible. a man groveling as he awaits his execution robs the executor of his sense of satisfaction, and loses his dignity.
in nietzsche's critique on christianity and the development of a theory of the origin of morals he claims that pity is the product of a clash of values that results in pity and consideration for the welfare of others becoming the cornerstone of modern values. judeo-christian values, such as humility, meekness, asceticism, equality of all and neighbourly love - are all the result of a weaker class of individuals winning out over their stronger counterparts. as the roman empire came to an end, the infiltration of christians into society resulted in the replacement of a more noble value system, based in power-seeking, war-glorifying, exuberance, and egoism. Instead -nietzsche claims- judeo-christian values of self-abnegation and retreat from the world came to the fore. these values were ultimately nihilistic in their outlook because they were grounded in the belief of a higher world and the existence of an afterlife rather than in the present material world. nietzsche considered these values to be unhealthy for those who practice them and for society. over time these values became so embedded in western thinking that they became the norm. we take for granted the values that have become the basis of western thinking and institutions.
nietzsche believed that these deep seated values needed to be expunged from society and he set out to develop a new set of morals to replace them, which were to be laid out in his final book as part of his 'revaluation of all values'. however he lost his sanity before completing this project. in his book beyond good and evil he prophesizes however, with a sense of hope the end of the dominance of judeo-christian values and the arrival of a new class of philsopher and individual which he developed as part of his work on the uebermensch.
nietzsches disdain for pity is troubling in the light of the events of the the 20thC. the horrors of the holocaust and mass killings that arose from humanity's attempt at establishing utopia on earth through communism or fascism remind us what man is capable of when they abandon conventional morality. it is possible that nietzsche did not have such society's in mind when he predicted a new value system, but there is no doubt that they arose out of a new disdain for these values. fascism had no room for pity or neighbourly love. i think therefore that nietzsche's belief that pity should be abolished is a mistaken one.
i argue that as a remedy for nietzsche's psychological egoism, we should consider a form of action-based evaluation. the motives for doing a good deed might be myriad, and many of them likely stem from selfish reasons, this does not however- mean that the action itself is deemed worthless. what counts is that we did the good act. even though it is often said that the road to hell is paved with good intentions, with a healthy dose of common sense and rational empathy we can avoid making bad decisions. if i analyze every motive behind my good deeds i will probably become disillusioned. the individual cannot refrain from being the cause behind his own actions, because after rall they originate in him. but motives should not be the sole source of extracting value form good actions, in particular for the person doing the good deed. we might mock a billionaire's philanthropy as being virtue-signaling to improve the reputation of his company- but in the end the good that resulted out of this action is what is important.