Francis Williams' Philosophy Blog

 What problems of  proving the moral law are overcome by the  'fact of reason' in the second critique? This essay intends to explain how the 'fact of reason' provides a successful argument in proving the existence of a necessarily binding moral law, and subsequently the necessity in the presupposition of freedom in the will of rational beings as a result of moral law. It will proceed from a problem arising out of of an 'unconditonal law requiring uncondional obedience', and will progress from this notion as a means to analyse the arguments of freedom and the moral law in the groundwork, and more specifically, in the critique of practical reason.   An action, if it is to have moral worth, must be based on a maxim which conforms to the universal law. Therefore, the determining grounds of the will ie. the decision to act; must be brought about by pure practical reason, which excludes all matter of a maxim as being heteronomy of the will. One might state this as 

 Does Russell's Theory in 'On Denoting' provide' provide a satisfactory answer to the problems posed by empty names? One problem of empty names is that they denote an event, person, or object which can fail to exist. Reference to non-existent persons such as the 'the present Tsar of Russia' or 'the present King of France' or the 'present Prime Minister of the United States'. Each of these examples refer to titles which have existed but at the time of their utterance , do not exist. The clearest example is the statement: 'The present king of France is bald' , which is referring to an non-existent entitiy 'The King of France'. Another example of an empty name is one which shares two identities, such as that Superman = Clark Kent, Mark Twain = Samuel Clemens, The present Queen of England = Elizabeth Windsor. WHen referring to one of these cases however it ought to be that, due to them being one and the same, a listenter ought to unde

  “ A film is a photograph of a dramatic representation; it is not, because it cannot be, a photographic representation”. The aim of this essay is to discuss two aspects of this claim. Essentially there ar two claims embedded within this statement. The first is that photographic representation is a contradiction. Scruton argues that there can be no such thing as a representation of a sbject in a photograph, but merely ‘ a surrogate’. The implication being that photographs have less artistic merit than other truly representational mediums, such as literature or painting. The second claim is that this argument extends into the realm of cinema in virtue of being a photographic art form, the implication being that cinematic artistic merit falls short of painting on the same grounds. The aim of this essay is to discuss, largely, the first claim and several counter arguments put forward against it by other philosophers, since in my opinion the two claims are dependent. The essay will con

  In 'A Treatise of Human Nature', Hume's account of justice reflects a Hobbesean cynicism with regard to mans potential for benevolent actions and responsibility. Despite making it explicit that he does not support the view that man is a 'monster incapable of nothing but vile deeds', his convictions ascribe to the ethical framework of an psychological egoist. His initial move is a stand against deontology: 'To suppose that the mere regard to the virtue of that action, may be the first motive, which produc'd the action, and render'd it virtuous, is to reason in a circle.' 1 A motive is required in which justice can be grounded, and Hume thus starts to eliminate several possibilities in order to arrive at his conclusion that justice and promise-keeping are artificial virtues. The essay will thus deal with his reasoning behind this conclusion and problems underlying them. Hume denies public benevolence as motive on the grounds that a duty made in s

'Our behavioural dispositions are not merely evidence of the existence of our mental states, they constitute our mental states'. An answer sufficient to appease;  upon first impression of such a contention, would have to be one of compromise. Common-sense tells us that a person's behaviour is a reliable means of understanding their present inward state. To conclude that nothing occurs in the mind except what is observed in its external manifestation, or that behavioural dispositions constitute our mental states (exempting a respective mental cognitive process), as is advocated by many materialist philosophers, is a tougher pill to swallow.  Outward expressions like speech, body language or facial expressions, are essential to every day inter-subjective communication, and one may presume that they are the most prominent means of sharing concepts, and understanding one another's complex inner beliefs and sensations. The issue under dispute is precisely that complexity of

 Discuss the contention that, in Crime and Punishment, Dostoevskii challenges the claims of rational philosophy by means of an illustration of mans inherent duality. Illustrate your answer with reference to characterisation and narrative style.   In the broad sense, the rational philosophers involved throughout the essay will refer to those who support the idea of an attainable social utopia on grounds of either utilitarian or socialist principles.  The psychological account of the crtime serves to undermine many misconceptions, in particular Raskolnikov's, about the feasibility of his deed . There are a host of blunders which occur dring the act itself, due to the failure of ‘Will and Reason’. Amidst waking dreams, and delerium, Raskolnikov wakes, an hour before the crime to start his preparations. There is little to suggests that Raskolnikov had made fully consciouss what trauma awaited him: "Even his recent rehearsal (the visit he had made with the intention of making a fin