Is Hume a Psychological Egoist?
In 'A Treatise of Human Nature', Hume's account of justice reflects a Hobbesean cynicism with regard to mans potential for benevolent actions and responsibility. Despite making it explicit that he does not support the view that man is a 'monster incapable of nothing but vile deeds', his convictions ascribe to the ethical framework of an psychological egoist. His initial move is a stand against deontology: 'To suppose that the mere regard to the virtue of that action, may be the first motive, which produc'd the action, and render'd it virtuous, is to reason in a circle.'1 A motive is required in which justice can be grounded, and Hume thus starts to eliminate several possibilities in order to arrive at his conclusion that justice and promise-keeping are artificial virtues. The essay will thus deal with his reasoning behind this conclusion and problems underlying them.
Hume denies public benevolence as motive on the grounds that a duty made in secret maintains the responsibility of the debtor. He only cites the assent of other moral philosophers to his aid. It appears a simple requisite that ones reputation ought to be subordinate to obligation in making an act virtuous. A positive deed of charity ought not depend on its being witnessed or made with reputation in view if it is to be good. Pursuing a life of secret crime while showing public charitability amounts to a degree of hypocrisy only a utilitarian or sceptic might find acceptable. Essential is that Hume is not referring to reputation which resides in the ego, but humanity in his argument. In his view, an act out of the love of mankind or universal brotherhood is impossible because it clashes with man's natural passions, which places preference on his self, family, and spouse, before unrelated persons. Therefore any act arsing out of an interest for others, will either be conditional on some reciprocated act, a sympathetic feeling which is instinctual, or the pleasure of their presence. Donations to starving children in third world nations are not related to instinctual passions (depending on the television) and will in general be less imminent than saving ones own child in a burning fire.
Hume ties up private benevolence with motives 'of the other' in the same way duty is tied up with a motive of our own. Private benevolence is contingent, but only if we accept Hume's underlying consequential premises. A Kantian may object strongly to his argument, by arguing that one ought to respect man's autonomy: By refraining from our duty, the other becomes a means to an end - even if the consequences outweigh the duty. Furthermore, Hume denies two of the ends he cites as valid motives: in restricting a vicious person we are acting for the sake of humanity and in restraining a profligate debauchee we are acting out of sympathy. We are acting in our interests by limiting the actions of a 'friend-turned-enemy', and merely squandering money by repaying a miser. The latter fall in line with his prime motive for action: self-interest.
In none of the cases however, is the debtor acting in the interests of the creditor, and from both a deontological and psychological egoist's (his own) standpoint Hume thus fails to prove that private benevolence cannot be a universal motive for action. On empirical grounds he asserts 'private benevolence is, and ought to be, weaker in some persons, than in others: And in many, or indeed in most persons, must absolutely fail'. What Hume is driving towards, is that private benevolence, along with humanity, either does not exist at all, or if it does, must be a universal rule. Hume is prone to argue the former, on the dubitable, empirical claim that such a motive varies between individuals. Hume fails to realise that simply because some have negative motives, this does not prevent them from being able to perform benevolent ones (aside from those arising out of familial or sexual relations) if they adhere to principles such as the golden rule, or imperatives based on reasoning. A comparison may be drawn with many modern legal systems: prisoners in many countries cannot be sentenced for crimes they will commit, or are likely to commit.
In order to maintain his empirical philosophy, Hume is likely to place morality within the sphere of inclinations and not that of reason. In his view, morality is insufficient to hold sway on the passions, and since reason cannot be entirely responsible for morality either, a motive is lacking. Yet the Treatise also expounds an egoist ethic. Since justice can neither be grounded in the passions nor reason, the obvious solution lies in its being an artificial contrivance. Since there is no faculty of the mind, which corresponds to an unconditional motive of public or private benevolence, and passions are not likely to tend to any benevolence, Hume seeks an anthropological explanation.
Much in line with Hobbesean political philosophy, Hume admits justice to being a necessity to the security of one's possessions, leaving room for his egoist stance on morals. Unlike Mandeville, Hume is disinclined to view justice or promise-keeping as social artifices. Hume recognises a potential for sympathy arising out of the passions, which places him on the fence between the rationalists and sensualists.
The act of promise keeping in Hume’s view is both unintelligible and non-obligatory in a state of nature. Similarly to his views on justice, he conceives of agreements between two individuals to be one of necessity arising out of social convention. Hume thus develops a genealogy similar to Hobbes. As one member of society realises that by neglecting his promise he becomes ostracised, and becomes aware of the pain which the act itself is depends not only on the utterance of the words of a promise but also on being aware of the consequences of not fulfilling it. This corresponds to his empiricism as man in society develops the need for self-restraint and obligation by a necessary connection between aberration and punishment, which arises out of custom similarly to language or an exchange system. The result is that promises are held with reference to one’s own interests and stem from the self, and are kept in the same way that a social contract may arise out of each participant recognising the other’s own motives in their covenant. Unlike Hobbes, Hume does not see the convention as solely a restraint on the monstrous nature of man, evidence is his belief in man’s capacity for sympathy. Hume recognises that natural bonds precede artificial bonds and therefore guide and influence society. Since the natural affection remains, natural virtues do exist if only being a by-product of the natural affections. Hume, and Hobbes, alike are attempting to manipulate the golden rule to encompass their axiomatic psychological egoism. The mere act of comparing the pain of others, and recognising the possibility of it happening to oneself is enough to grant an instance of empathy.
Bibliography
David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Penguin Classics, 1989
Roger Scruton, Modern philosophy, Vintage, 1991
D.H. Monro, A Guide to the British Moralists, Fontana, 1989
The Oxford Philosophy Dictionary, Simon Blackburn, 2001
1 A Treatise of human Nature, BK 3 On morals, p. 530