Is Hume a Psychological Egoist?
In 'A Treatise of Human Nature', Hume's account of justice reflects a Hobbesean cynicism with regard to mans potential for benevolent actions and responsibility. Despite making it explicit that he does not support the view that man is a 'monster incapable of nothing but vile deeds', his convictions ascribe to the ethical framework of an psychological egoist. His initial move is a stand against deontology: 'To suppose that the mere regard to the virtue of that action, may be the first motive, which produc'd the action, and render'd it virtuous, is to reason in a circle.' 1 A motive is required in which justice can be grounded, and Hume thus starts to eliminate several possibilities in order to arrive at his conclusion that justice and promise-keeping are artificial virtues. The essay will thus deal with his reasoning behind this conclusion and problems underlying them. Hume denies public benevolence as motive on the grounds that a duty made in s...